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Abstract. We analyze five commentaries to our “Socio-theoretic Accounts of
IS: The Problem of Agency” paper. We find more commonalty in the way we
think about theory and theory development in the IS field than expected, and
clear up some misconceptions about our intentions. Actor network IS theorists
are reluctant to accept the way we frame the problem of agency and we consider some of their arguments and propose counter arguments.
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1 Introduction
In our paper “Socio-theoretic Accounts of IS: the Problem of Agency” (SJIS,
this issue p. 133) we argued that one way of characterizing the relationship
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between organisations and technology in the IS field is to study agency. However two of the theories most used by socially oriented IS researchers, structuration theory and actor network theory, have at their hearts different and
incompatible accounts of agency. In structuration theory, humans exhibit
agency but computer systems don’t; in actor network theory, both humans and
machines act, somewhat symmetrically. Moreover IS scholars often adapt the
two theories in ways which distort these theoretical principles, such that
machines do come to display agency in structurational accounts of IS, whereas
humans and machines are not treated symmetrically in ANT accounts. We
described these contradictions as the problem of agency and suggested that the
problem could be recognized empirically (for instance in the treatment of ERP
implementations), and was also reflected widely across the field. We further
suggested some guidelines for a more consistent theoretical treatment of
agency, and a metaphor for that theoretical development: ‘the double dance of
agency.’
We are grateful to the SJIS debate forum editor Karlheinz Kautz for organizing (with customary thoroughness) a series of short responses from eminent
scholars to our argument, and then asking us to write this short summarizing
paper. We assume that, if you are reading this paper, you have also read both
our original contribution and the five responses to it—otherwise it will not
make a great deal of sense! Hanseth (SJIS, this issue p. 159) is more negative
about the contribution of structuration theory to IS than we were, and correspondingly more positive about the contribution of actor network theory, suggesting that it addresses and resolves central problems in the relationship of
organisations and technology. He suggests some more recent work that
socially-oriented IS theorists could usefully adopt, but also that we need to
move from being theory consumers (importers and appliers) to being theory
developers and exporters. Theory development as a theme is also the principal
focus of Holmström (SJIS, this issue p. 167), who, whilst disagreeing with our
contention that there should be a more consistent theorisation of agency in IS
studies, focuses on the historical context of theories and their trajectory—what
came before and what comes next. McMaster and Wastell (SJIS, this issue p.
175), responding to our challenge to ANT theorists to be more specific about
the way non-humans (here computer systems) act, argue that this is really a
non-issue in ANT. The challenge is expressed in a way that separates and contrasts humans and machines—precisely the dichotomy that Latour’s project
sets out to undermine. In their view it would make more sense to eschew this
symmetrophobia and talk about the agency of hybrids or collectives.
Orlikowski (SJIS, this issue p. 183) essentially agreed with our theoretical
analysis and thought that we could do better in theorising agency. She suggests
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a distinction between human agency and material performativity as a way forward. Lastly Walsham (SJIS, this issue p. 153) nicely tops our double dance
metaphor by advocating that, instead of building integrative agency theories,
we should “encourage a thousand theoretical flowers to bloom.” We thank all
these authors for the care and consideration they have shown our paper, and
the many good ideas they have contributed.
These contributions raise too many issues to address individually, so
instead we look for common themes and address them somewhat in the order
of the argument of the original problem of agency paper. In passing we hope
also to address many of the individual points. We set out to identify the major
issues, correct some received impressions of our work which didn’t intend to
project, and understand what implications the various arguments have for our
argument and the directions we proposed.

2 On Structuration Theory
Hanseth takes a somewhat critical view of the contribution of structuration
theory to the IS field. He points out that structuration theory, in common with
many other social theories, is technology blind. This has in practice meant that
a central task in ST adaptation as been to weave the technology into the theory,
and that the more faithful the adapter is to the original theory, the less technology has its own voice, and the less it stands centre stage (the issue of how
faithful a theory adapter should be is one we address later). Hanseth’s argument is, in essence, not a very different argument from the argument we adopt
in the problem of agency paper—our version of this proposition is, however
focused on the agency question. We tend to agree that the understanding of
technology in a social context that we need to achieve is “exactly the relationship ... between the technological artefact and the technology-in-practice”
(Hanseth, this issue p. 160). However we would argue that understanding the
dual nature of agency (how machines act on people, how people act on
machines) is a useful way to do this. Hanseth rather ignores the positive role
of ST (and key ST adapters such as Orlikowski) in sensitizing the IS field to
social issues, progressing it beyond over-simplified managerial and organisational explanations, and opening up the debate about technology and organisations. However his position seems to strengthen rather than undermine our
‘problem of agency’ argument.
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3 On Actor Network Theory
Both Hanseth and McMaster and Wastell raise more serious issues about our
treatment of ANT. Hanseth finds our presentation of ANT too focused on the
issue of symmetry, which he implies is a historical concern. He would rather
forget symmetry and concentrate on hybrids and collectives. McMaster and
Wastell go directly for the jugular and accuse us of “symmetrophobic block”
(p. 175) (we enjoyed their contribution and have made appointments with our
doctors to see whether this unfortunate affliction can be cured!) They are also
concerned with symmetry, but more with its role in an overarching rejection of
the polarisation of the social and the technical, than with its analytical role
within the theory. Symmetry, they rightly point out, is not the same as equivalence (humans and machines can be treated symmetrically without being
regarded as equivalent). They characterize Latour’s project as the “unravelling
the modernist epistemological settlement” of dualism and essentialism (p.
177). Our problem of agency is, in their view, just another expression of dualism and essentialism (humans and machines, properties of agency). Both contributors would prefer to investigate agency as an emergent or shared property
of the network, hybrid or collective, and argue that it is meaningless to separate out the components of a hybrid and attribute agency to them, at least in
ANT terms.
Whilst we agree that we gave a symmetry-focused account of ANT, this is
largely because this is the most obvious place to start an examination of
agency, and because it has been a long-standing difficulty for critics of the
theory. We are less concerned with Latour’s deconstruction of the role of
science in modernism and (in this respect ANT is at least as far away from
traditional IS interests as structuration theory, despite a more technological
orientation) and more concerned with good, socially sensitive explanations of
IS phenomena. In this respect McMaster and Wastell’s focus on Latour’s
project is a straw man—here may be some theorists who adopt crude
polarising positions, but, as we pointed out in the original problem of agency
paper, IS researchers hardly ever do. IS researchers find different ways to
theorize man/machine hybrids, with different conceptual backgrounds. When
it comes to ANT as a plausible explanation of IS phenomena, we admire the
principal of analytical symmetry (treat things in an equivalent fashion) and its
associated analytical scepticism (don’t take conventional wisdom for granted).
It’s less clear that ANT provides a set of concepts that facilitate analytical
symmetry in the IS field—the conceptual apparatus often implies
anthropomorphised non-human actants with quasi human capabilities. This
gives a superficial frisson of theoretical excitement, but is hard to apply in
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analysis. Whereas analytical symmetry may be a useful principle, ontological
symmetry is not (what’s the meaning of asserting that a human and a nonhuman actor are symmetrical); however the two are much confused in ANT
rhetoric.
Hanseth suggests that instead of focusing on symmetry, we should focus on
the ANT notion of hybrid collectif (hybrid collective). “Humans and technologies” he writes “are not equal or symmetrical beyond the fact that they are,
when they act, parts of a hybrid collectif which should be seen as the ‘real’
actor” (p. 161). McMaster and Wastell go further: “only collectives can act.”
We don’t agree that this removes the problem of agency for ANT theorists.
What constitutes the ‘real’ actor here is determined primarily by a shift of analytical focus. At the level of the travel industry “Boeing 747s do not fly, airlines fly” (Latour 1999, p. 117). The airline is an assemblage of human and
non-human actants which does not perform the function of an airline unless all
the actants work together (however this is a trivial observation for the majority
of IS theorists). At other analytical levels the statement is meaningless. A
modern computer controlled airliner can take off, fly the Atlantic and land on
another continent without human intervention. The airliner can still fly if the
airline is absent (Lamar Hunt owned his own 747). The pilots are flying the
plane in the sense of controlling all the various flying technologies. The passengers are ‘flying’ but that’s only a semantic coincidence, they are not agents
in the flying process. ANT is partly a process theory about how heterogeneous
human and non-human components come to be stabilized in networks, which
then become components in other networks. We’re therefore entitled to consistent and believable explanations of how those components act in the formation of networks or collectives.

4 On ERP Systems as Examples of the
Problem of Agency
McMaster and Wastell point out that our case studies are (necessarily sketchy)
narratives constructed for a particular purpose: to illustrate common IS perspectives on the relationship between ERP and organisations, and human and
machine agency. They make their own short analysis in relation to actor network theory, finding that the third analysis is the closest to their own perspective. We observe here that we should be careful not to put the theoretical cart
before the empirical horse. We are traditional enough to want to have our the-
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oretical explanations fit the empirical facts, rather than evaluating the empirical evidence according to whether it fits our favourite theories.

5 On Agency, and the Problem of Agency
Holmström appears to believe that we advocate combining structuration theory and actor network theory, but we didn’t intend to convey this. Part of the
point of demonstrating the two theories’ different accounts of agency is to
demonstrate how irreconcilable they are. We instead use the theoretical discussion to focus on a problem which we believe to be fairly general across the
field. We suggest that critical reflection on these two popular theories may be
a suitable starting point for achieving a more coherent account of agency in
the IS context. To the extent that we can surface and explore the treatment of
agency in different social theories, we can clarify differences and strengths
and weaknesses of particular theories in particular settings, establish some
common vocabulary and translation between theories, and hence enable a
richer understanding of agency. If we could establish a shared understanding
(in general terms) then this would provide a firmer basis for discussion of
agency with respect to IS, and avoid (some) confusions and miscommunication. Even going some way towards this should improve communication, enabling a more constructive debate. However, Walsham took the sixth challenge
in the problem of agency paper (building integrative theory about agency) to
mean that we advocated bringing the various theories of agency together in
“one grand theory of agency” (p. 156). We accept that we formulated this challenge a little carelessly, so that it could easily be taken to mean this. It should
be apparent by now that we are not much for grand theories. Our understanding of theory progression is expressed nicely by Holmström and we discuss
this in the next section. Integrative theory is discussed elsewhere (Rose et al.
2004) as an alternative process to theory adaptation (taking a theory from
another discipline and adapting it for IS use).
Orlikowski agrees with our analysis of structuration theory and actor network theory. Even if we were to accede to the arguments of the ANT enthusiasts and agree to focus on the agency of hybrids it would still be the case that
“structurational perspectives reflect the humanist tradition of making the
human subject the center of the action, while actor-network perspectives adopt
a post-humanist stance with their decentering of the human subject” (p. 184).
Drawing on Jones (1999), she proposes terminological changes: ‘human
agency’ but ‘material performativity’ which both recognize and distinguish
but don’t equate the concepts. We think this is a useful suggestion (see also
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Collins and Kutsch’s (1998) distinction between human action and machine
behaviour), but would like to be careful about avoiding privileging either
humans or machines (we’re not so symmetrophobic after all!), and point out
that better theorisations are also needed to back the terminology up.
We made some suggestions for the direction this theorisation might take
(which are not substantially different from Orlikowski’s). We also provided a
metaphor: the double dance of agency. As McMaster and Wastell remorselessly (and wittily) point out, a metaphor is a feeble substitute for a theory, but
we are not quite so naïve as we appear and we have another card up our
sleeve. The double dance of agency is given a much fuller theoretical treatment in Rose and Jones (2005).

6 On the IS Field and Development of
Theory
Walsham prefers to “encourage a thousand theoretical flowers to bloom”
rather than try to build integrative theories about agency. We discussed earlier
a difference in understanding about what an integrative theory might be
(another flower, not a lawnmower). However, several authors share concerns
about the way we (the IS community) use the various theoretical flowers we
find in the surrounding meadows. Hanseth is concerned about consumerism in
the importing and application of social theories, where a theory becomes fashionable for a short period, to be replaced by another without leaving noticeable
traces in the collective memory. He points to some technologically-oriented
theories which could be more relevant candidate reference theories than many
we have chosen to import. He would like to see a move to developing and
exporting theories, primarily design theories. However design theories
(besides posing particular justification problems), are based on explanatory
and descriptive theories (Walls et al. 1992). We should also like to see these
explanatory and descriptive flowers flourish. Holmström focuses on “what
came before and what comes next” P. 167), locating theory in the cumulative
tradition (“ongoing discourse”), and using it to orientate the trajectory of the
discipline. Our way of doing this is through theoretical problem setting. The
problem of agency is both located in the discipline tradition, and sets a specific
research agenda. Another way of doing this is embodied in Walsham’s
description of his GIS work. A plurality of theoretical resources contributes to
the analysis, which is thus well located in the discipline discourse (rather than
the current trendy theory) and moves the discourse on.
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The contributors all share a concern for tending the IS theoretical garden.
They want to see the right flowers flourish (some of the meadow flowers are
weeds in the IS garden), see them arranged in attractive but natural patterns,
attend to the continuous development of the garden from year to year, and
develop some subtly beautiful new flower varieties which they could sell to
other keen gardeners.
That is certainly as far as that analogy will stretch!

7 Conclusions
Having considered some major themes from the five commentary papers we
now return to the original argument from the ‘Socio-theoretic Accounts of IS:
the Problem of Agency’ paper. It seems we inadvertently gave the impression
that we wanted the IS community to develop a grand theory of agency which
would replace other theories, but this is not the case. We point to a problem in
the way we adapt reference two theories (incompatible accounts of agency)
show that it is generalizable to other IS issues (for instance accounts of ERP
system implementation) and suggest some directions for progress towards
more consistent accounts of agency. It may be that ANT theorists will not
accept our formulation of the problem, but we still conclude that they have
some agency issues to address if they want to develop ANT to be a believable
and consistent descriptive theory of IS phenomena. We agree that terminological precision is part of the solution to the problem of agency, but still maintain that we could do with some better theorisations of it. We still think there is
value to the basic idea of identifying underlying theoretical problems in the
field and trying to solve them. The problems are our problems, not the problems of the disciplines that we borrowed the theories from, and the consequent
theory developments are, good or bad, our theories.

References
Collins, H., and Kusch, M. The shape of Actions: What humans and machines can do,
The MIT Press, MA, 1998.
Jones, M. “Information Systems and the Double Mangle,” in Information Systems:
Current Issues and Future Changes, T. J. Larsen, L. Levine and J. I. DeGross
(eds.), OmniPress, New York, 1999, pp. 287-302.
Latour, B. Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.

194 • J. Rose, M. Jones & D. Truex

http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol17/iss1/9

8

Rose et al.: The Problem of Agency Re-visited

Rose, J., and Jones, M. “The Double Dance of Agency: A Socio-Theoretic Account of
How Machines and Humans Interact,” Systems, Signs and Actions, (1:1), 2005,
p. 19-37.
Rose, J., Lindgren, R., and Henfridsson, O. “Socio-Technical Structure: Competence
Systems at Volvo IT,” in IFIP TC8/ WG 8.2: Relevant Theory and Informed
Practice, B. Kaplan, D. Truex, D. Wastell, A. T. Wood-Harper and J. I.
DeGross (eds.), Kluwer, Manchester, 2004, pp. 411-433.
Walls, J. G., Widmeyer, G. R., and El Sawy, O. A. “Building an Information System
Design Theory for Vigilant EIS,” Information Systems Research, (3:1), 1992,
pp. 36-59.

J. Rose, M. Jones & D. Truex • 195

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2005

9

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 17 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 9

196 • J. Rose, M. Jones & D. Truex

http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol17/iss1/9

10

